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Early on in Sally Rooney’s coming-of-age novel Conversations With Friends, the protagonist 
Frances, a university student who performs poetry with a friend, engages in flirtatious e-mail 
correspondence with a handsome but married actor. She praises his performance in a play, 
and he returns the favour by saying nice things about one of her poems. Reflecting on the 
difference between performing a play and writing words on the screen, Frances tries to 
understand what she’s being praised for: 
At a certain level of abstraction, anyone could have written the poem, but that didn’t 
feel true either. It seemed as though what he was really saying was: there’s 
something beautiful about the way you think and feel, or the way that you experience 
the world is beautiful in some way. (Rooney 2017, 36) 
 
I’m going to argue that Frances gets something important right here about the grounds of 
aesthetic and more broadly creative merit. Aesthetically valuable poems or paintings can 
amount to achievements that are to the artist’s credit and as such may make admiration and 
other positive attitudes towards them fitting. Yet it is puzzling in the light of standard theories 
of achievement, responsibility, and merit just why this is the case. Such theories have 
typically been developed in the context of moral praise or blame for voluntary action, and 
emphasize notions like effort, control, expressing the agent’s values, or responsiveness to 
reasons. But, as I’ll argue, creative achievements don’t necessarily involve any of these – they 
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can be effortless, out of voluntary or rational control, and independent of the agent’s values 
and reasoning. 
This suggests that the grounds of ethical praiseworthiness, on the one hand, and 
aesthetic (and more generally creative) praiseworthiness, on the other, are deeply different. 
I’ll argue that artistic merit is grounded at least in part on an exercise of spontaneous agency 
that is ultimately neither a matter of the will or values. Briefly, I argue that what is distinctive 
of aesthetic (or quasi-aesthetic) creative processes are directed by what I call aspirational 
aims, which are formulated in evaluative terms, like creating a beautiful painting, an 
insightful poem, or (in a quasi-aesthetic case) a nifty workaround. Anyone can have such 
aims, since it is possible to set oneself such a target without knowing what would constitute 
its realization in descriptive terms. (They differ from what I call guiding aims, which include 
a kind of blueprint for what constitutes their realization.) What ultimately sets successful 
creators apart from others is not that they make more of an effort to realize such aims or that 
they have somehow better values or character, but that they successfully perceive (or conceive 
of) novel affordances or solicitations that are appealing in the light of their aspirational aim, 
and respond to them in way that realizes the aim to a sufficient degree. For example, a 
praiseworthy painter sees – perhaps after many rounds of trial and error – that adding such-
and-such strokes of paint would render a smile enigmatic, and that this would serve the 
purpose of the work. This can be an exercise of a kind of perceptual skill – but importantly, 
need not be. Nor is it necessarily effortful. 
My claim, then, is that it is the non-volitional spontaneity exercised in such 
successful acts of active perception that fundamentally grounds artistic and more broadly 
creative merit in virtue of manifesting an easily ignored aspect or layer of the active self. I 
suggest that this involves spontaneously extending emotionally resonant patterns in a way that 
enriches the content of our perceptions or conceptions so that we find ways of furthering and 
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refining our aspirations. The reason why creative achievements are difficult is therefore 
different from many other kinds of achievement: it’s not that it takes a lot of effort or skill to 
create something new and valuable, but that no amount of effort or skill will suffice to bring 
about the moment of insight, an exercise of spontaneous agency that is our own doing but not 
up to us in the ordinary way. It is no wonder that they often teach us something about 
ourselves we wouldn’t otherwise have known. 
 
1. The Puzzle of Artistic Achievement 
Before turning to merit, let’s start with what makes something an artistic or creative 
achievement. Strictly speaking, achievements are performances that are in some way 
successful. So while we might loosely say that a book is an achievement, it is really the 
writing of a great book that constitutes the achievement. I say ‘a great book’, because what is 
of interest here are not just any old successes, like peeling a banana or coming to know that 
it’s sunny today, but the kind of success in realizing one’s aims that may suffice to give 
direction and purpose to one’s life – ‘capital-A achievements’, as Gwen Bradford (2015) puts 
it. The standard line on what makes something a capital-A achievement that is to the credit of 
the achiever, most influentially articulated by Bradford, is that realizing one’s aim must be 
difficult (for the achiever) and its success competently caused rather than just lucky.1 I’ll focus 
first on the difficulty condition, and how it should be understood in light of creative 
achievements. 
What, then, makes something difficult? Bradford observes that it’s not complexity or 
skill, since not all complex performances, such as speaking one’s native language, are 
difficult, unless there’s some special obstacle to overcome (2015, 34). Instead, she holds that 
 
1 It is a further question whether the achievement is good or good for the achiever, and 
whether its value requires the product to be valuable. I’ll set these questions aside here, 
assuming only that producing something that is valuable (e.g. by luck) doesn’t suffice for 
achievement. 
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what makes something difficult is that it requires effort. Let’s call this type of view effortism. 
One important question for it concerns the nature of effort. Bradford treats it as a primitive 
notion she does not attempt to define (2015, 39). However, as her discussion of the value of 
achievement makes clear, she takes effort to be a matter of the will – perhaps something like 
the exercise of willpower. As she says in an earlier piece, “I take effort here as something 
quite familiar – exertion of will.” (2013, 219) Effort, thus understood, always has a certain 
level of intensity and duration. For Bradford, the total amount of effort relevant to difficulty 
isn’t a simple function of intensity and duration, however, since otherwise an activity that 
required only very low intensity effort but lasted a long enough time would be more difficult 
than an activity that required very intense effort for a shorter period. So she holds instead that 
only effort that is above a threshold of minimum intensity, which may vary by activity, counts 
for difficulty (2015, 49). Thus, her final view is that something is difficult for an agent when 
it requires a sufficient degree of total intense effort from her. 
 So, for Bradford, all achievements are difficult, and difficulty is analysed in terms of 
intense effort. Some achievements are greater than others, and this, again, is in part a function 
of difficulty and effort for Bradford: “It seems plausible that achievements that are very 
difficult are greater than those that, other things being equal, are less difficult.” (2015, 63) 
(The other things here include competent causation and possibly the value of the product of 
the agent’s performance.) Bradford acknowledges that there seem to be effortless 
achievements, such as a virtuoso performance of a complex piece of music. To address this, 
she distinguishes between being difficult for someone and being difficult, period. Something 
is difficult, period, when it is or would be difficult for most contextually relevant agents, say 
most people who attempt to play a Paganini piece on the violin (2015, 62). For them, it does 
or would take a lot of effort to do so successfully. However, while it’s true that performing 
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the piece is difficult, it’s not difficult for the virtuoso. The virtuoso’s capital-A achievement is 
thus not playing the piece but rather acquiring the level of skill needed to do so effortlessly. 
 There are many cases for which Bradford’s account of difficulty seems plausible. 
But what about creative achievements? Let’s take a couple of examples. Here’s the first work 
I want to talk about:  
 
That is of course Marcel Duchamp’s famous Fountain, which was, among other things, voted 
the most influential artwork of the 20th century in a poll of art professionals. There’s little 
doubt that creating it – at least in the sense of turning it into an artwork that raised questions 
about the very notion of art while retaining a kind of aesthetic beauty and generating a rich 
web of resonant associations – was an artistic achievement. What was involved in the process, 
however? Well, in the background was the idea of ‘readymade’ art, which Duchamp had had 
for a while, possibly as a result of setting up a bicycle wheel in his studio for his amusement, 
and subsequently realizing it might be thought of as a work of art. In one version of the story, 
Duchamp walked around New York City in April 1917 with this idea in mind with two artist 
friends, Walter Arensberg and Joseph Stella. They eventually arrived at a plumbing specialist. 
Here’s how Will Gompertz describes the scene: 
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Inside, Arensberg and Stella stifle giggles while their companion ferrets around 
among the bathrooms and door-handles that are on display. After a few minutes he 
calls the store assistant over and points to an unexceptional, flat-backed, white 
porcelain urinal. … After buying the urinal Duchamp takes it to his studio. He lays 
the heavy porcelain object on its back and turns it around, so it appears to be upside 
down. He then signs and dates it in black paint on the left-hand side of its outer rim, 
with the pseudonym “R. Mutt 1917.” His work is nearly done. There is only one 
more job remaining: he needs to give his urinal a name. He chooses Fountain. 
(Gompertz 2012, 3–4) 
 




That is Picasso’s popular take on Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, originally published in a 
French literary magazine in 1955. I haven’t found any description of how Picasso painted this 
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particular picture, but I’ve seen documentary footage of him painting, and I think it is safe to 
say that he didn’t break a sweat sketching this image that nonetheless captures something 
essential about the characters and their environment. Indeed, the apparent spontaneity and 
confidence is an important part of its charm. 
 So, here we have two instances of apparent creative achievement. How do they fit 
with Bradford’s influential view? Not very well at all. We have no evidence of intense effort 
or the use of willpower in either case – and indeed, we don’t seem to need to know anything 
about the level of effort that the artists made to recognize that what they did was difficult. To 
be sure, there’s effort involved in the trivial sense in which any intentional action takes some 
effort – it doesn’t happen by itself, or it wouldn’t be an intentional action. But that doesn’t 
suffice for a capital-A achievement on any account. Nor is it necessary that a large share of 
the artists’ internal resources is used, to take Hasko von Kriegstein’s (2017) alternative 
account of effort – we’ve no need to know what internal resources Duchamp or Picasso had 
and how much of them they used to recognize their achievements. 
 Could effortists respond with the move that Bradford makes in the virtuoso case – by 
saying that while creating great art is difficult for us ordinary folk, it’s not that hard for the 
master artist? There’s two reasons why this model doesn’t extend to the kind of artistic and 
creative achievements I’m focusing on. First, such achievements are difficult for people like 
Picasso as well. He created a lot, and not all of it was really worth it, presumably not because 
he didn’t try, but because he didn’t always (or even most of the time) succeed, as he would 
have, had it been easy for him. And achievements were difficult for him, even if success 
didn’t take much of an exercise of the will (I’ll explain below how that is possible). It’s just 
not the way to accomplish these things – and indeed, as we’ll see, that’s a big part of the story 
why they’re so difficult to do. Second, while major creative achievements are indeed difficult 
for ordinary folk, it’s not because of the effort they require. Indeed, in some cases, intense 
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effort would arguably undermine the status of the performance as an achievement. Imagine 
Picasso had slaved away at his Don Quixote for three years day and night, and come away 
with just the same result. That would seem like less of an achievement to me.  
 So, in short, it looks like the standard story of achievement is ill-equipped to make 
sense of creative achievements and the difficulty involved in them. Somehow, we need to 
broaden it. 
 
2. The Puzzle of Artistic Merit 
It’s not only what makes something an achievement in the creative case that is hard to explain 
on standard views, but also the sense in which creative achievements are to the credit of the 
artist. As Susan Wolf (2016) has recently emphasized, we have potentially fitting pro-
attitudes ranging from admiration to affection and even love toward artists on account of their 
work. But on what grounds are aesthetic achievements attributable to artists in the sense that 
is linked to credit? 
 Let’s start with the notion of attributability I’m using here. Gary Watson (1996) 
distinguishes between what he calls the ‘two faces’ of responsibility. The more familiar face 
is accountability. By accountability Watson means susceptibility to praise and, above all, 
blame. Blame, for Watson, consists in attitudes that involve a readiness for adverse or 
unwelcome treatment of the target. These attitudes encompass what Peter Strawson (1962) 
famously labeled reactive attitudes, such as resentment, indignation, and gratitude, which are 
responses to the quality of will manifest by the agent. For Watson, holding people 
accountable for their misdeeds by expressing such attitudes is constitutive of treating them as 
moral equals, and it serves an important social function of enforcing mutually respectful 
conduct.  
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Accountability is commonly linked to control – as the thought goes, it couldn’t be 
appropriate to blame me for something that is not up to me. The most familiar kind of control 
is the sort of direct voluntary control we typically have over our intentional actions, but many 
have tried to articulate different kinds of control to account for responsibility for states like 
belief that are plausibly independent of our will. For example, Conor McHugh (2013; 2017) 
argues that responsibility for beliefs requires attitudinal control, which we have, roughly, 
when the actual mechanism we use to form the belief (such as visual perception) is responsive 
to epistemic reasons, so that even if we get it wrong, we would have gotten it right in a 
suitable range of counterfactual cases by using the same mechanism. This is a form of 
guidance control (Fischer and Ravizza 1998), which breaks down to reasons-receptivity 
(recognizing at least some of the pertinent reasons) and reasons-reactivity (responding to the 
recognition of sufficient reasons by forming the attitude). In this sense, our attitudes are in our 
control to the extent we can form or at least revise them by reasoning (McHugh 2017, 2757). 
Attitudinal or ‘rational’ control (Hieronymi 2008) might then suffice for accountability. 
 Attributability, in turn, constitutes what Watson calls the “aretaic face of 
responsibility”. Beyond holding people accountable, we need to distinguish between the 
actions and attitudes that genuinely reflect who someone is and that therefore are to their 
credit or discredit from those that don’t. It is common to focus here on people’s values one 
way or another. On Watson’s own view, actions and attitudes are attributable to an agent 
when they issue from her values and aims. In the same vein, David Shoemaker holds that an 
attitude is attributable to an agent “just in case it expresses the agent’s deep self, that is, just in 
case it is causally dependent on, and its content is harmonious with, at least one of the agent’s 
cares, commitments, or care-commitment clusters” (2015, 59). Similarly, Thomas Scanlon 
(1998) and Angela Smith (2008) hold that attributability requires that the attitude in question 
is rationally related to the agent’s evaluative judgments. Importantly, attributability-
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responsibility does not require control or avoidability – even if you couldn’t have done 
otherwise, an act can reveal who you are in the sense of manifesting your values, 
commitments, or evaluative judgments.  
As a kind of responsibility, attributability involves more than grounding an 
evaluation of the agent as good or bad in some way. One way to cash this out is in terms of 
appropriateness of attitudes like esteem, veneration, awe, contempt, and revulsion, as David 
Shoemaker (2015) does. I’ve argued that such attitudes guide us in aspiring to improve 
ourselves (Kauppinen 2019). Alternatively, Scanlon and Smith hold that attributability as 
manifestation of evaluative judgment suffices to make it appropriate to demand the agent to 
justify her attitude (and the resulting action) by giving her reasons for it. This sort of 
answerability for attitudes that are attributable to us is one way in which they plausibly differ 
from good or bad attitudes we’re not responsible for, or brute reactions like nausea.2 
 We can sum up the distinction between accountability and attributability as follows: 
Mode of 
responsibility 
Link between action 
and self 
Response to the 
agent 
Underlying concern 
Accountability Action in the agent’s 
control/avoidable, 








Attributability Action expresses the 
agent’s deep self/the 










Living a good human 
life, models and 
ideals, justifiability 
to each other 
 
Accounts of credit- and blameworthiness have been developed largely in the moral context. 
How should we understand artistic credit on this model? When we appreciate what an artist 
has done or criticize their unsuccessful works, we’re not holding them accountable – though 
 
2 It should be noted that Smith (2008, 377ff.) explicitly denies that a distinction between 
accountability and attributability is needed, since she believes that the notion of answerability 
suffices to make sense of our moral responsibility practices. 
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of course, we can hold artists accountable by way of reactive attitudes as a result of subjecting 
their work to moral evaluation. It is not the quality of their will that we’re responding to. This 
is not surprising, given the absence of direct voluntary control. Nor does attitudinal control of 
the sort that may be involved in belief and intention seem to fit the bill – an artist need not be 
able to reason to the conclusion that such-and-such stroke or tint is the right one. 
 In any case, it is certainly clear that we can and do give artists credit by way of 
adopting attitudes that show we attribute their achievements to them in Watson’s sense. This 
is a plausible model also given the rationale for attribution in terms of reflecting or disclosing 
who the agent is. Works of art do show us something about the artist. But when we come to 
explaining why creative achievements are attributable to artists, the standard model gives out. 
After all, on the picture that focuses on moral responsibility, the self is defined in terms of 
values, commitments, and cares. And if we admire, say, Picasso’s performance, it’s not 
because we see it as reflecting somehow peculiarly excellent values or character. (He was an 
egoistic prick, after all.) Nor does it seem to be the case that we expect artists to be able to 
justify their choices in terms of rational relation to their evaluative judgments, which may 
after all not differ so much from the rest of us. So what, then could serve as the basis for 
giving credit and not merely evaluating someone’s artistic performance as good? I think Wolf 
points in the right direction when she says of Henry James and James Joyce that “It is for 
their brilliance, their insight, their originality, and so on, as realized in their extraordinary 
novels that they deserve credit” (2016, 7). In the next section, I’ll develop an idea in this 
ballpark. 
 
3. Creativity and Active Perception 
So far, I’ve argued that standard accounts of achievement and credit don’t seem to apply to 
creative work. In this section, I’ll begin to articulate an alternative account of each. What I’ll 
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propose is that artistic and more broadly creative achievements disclose a different aspect of 
the self than valuing or caring, namely, the self as an active perceiver. I’ll start by discussing 
what’s involved in creativity.  
 In the literature, creativity is sometimes defined in terms of characteristics of creative 
products – for example, Margaret Boden defines it as the “ability to come up with ideas or 
artefacts that are new, surprising and valuable” (2004, 1). But as Berys Gaut, among others, 
has pointed out, one might come up with new, surprising, and valuable artefacts in a non-
creative way, for example a brute search that goes through every available option, as Charles 
Goodyear is said to have done when he came up with vulcanized rubber (Gaut 2009, 85). So I 
think it’s more fruitful to focus on creative processes rather than products. Most agree that 
such processes can’t be mechanistic, routine, rule-guided, or derivative. Nor will arriving at 
something new and valuable by sheer luck count as being creative – but as we’ll see, we have 
to be careful here with the notion of luck.  
When it comes to positively defining what makes a process creative, two broad 
families of views emerge. I’ll label them exceptionalist and assimilationist. According to 
exceptionalists, at least artistic creativity involves something fundamentally different from 
ordinary thinking, such as inspiration from the Gods, or Freudian unconscious associations, or 
something akin to madness. According to assimilationists, in contrast, creativity is a special 
case of everyday problem-solving, and involves basically the same kind of processes and 
abilities.3 For example, one might creatively solve a problem by considering an analogical 
situation in another domain. The view I want to defend is going to be mildly exceptionalist, 
but in a way that hopefully accommodates the data speaking in favour of assimilationism (for 
which see especially Weisberg 2006).  
 
3 I’ll focus throughout on psychological creativity (P-creativity) rather than historical 
creativity (H-creativity), where the latter involves psychological creativity that produces 
something novel in history (Boden 2004). 
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Let’s begin with a paradigm case that easily lends itself to verbal discussion, namely 
poetic innovation. I’m going to make use of the same example as Margaret Boden (this 
volume), one of Marvell’s couplets about our finitude in ‘To His Coy Mistress’. The speaker, 
pleading his case for urgent tenderness, professes that did we not have such a limited time to 
live, “My vegetable love should grow/Vaster than empires and more slow”, but as it is, it’s 
time to get on with the business. Suppose that at some point during the composition of the 
poem, Marvell was faced with the problem of how to fill in the line “My ___ love should 
grow”. (For my purposes, it’s neither here nor there whether he as a matter of conceived of 
the entire line at once.) The English language offers many possible ways to fill in the gap – 
you could say “burning love” or “considerable love”, for example. The vast majority of these 
possibilities are lousy in terms of poetic effect, of course, or either nonsensical or trite, and as 
such the opposite of creative.  
What is involved in creative choice, then? I think everyone has to agree that we can 
analytically distinguish at least two elements: production and selection of novel ideas, as well 
as their realization in a medium (which may be simultaneous when the medium is language). 
Somehow Marvell had to think of “vegetable” (whether straight away or after considering 
alternatives), which he found at least good enough for his purposes. For this process to be 
creative, it clearly couldn’t be an application of a rule or routine he had learned or established 
from past experience, as Maria Kronfeldner (2009) emphasizes. Nor could the production of 
the idea be random. After all, imagine that the process was carried out by two people, Anna 
and Belle, responsible for production and selection of ideas, respectively. If Anna randomly 
proposes words (say, without knowing the purpose of the exercise), and Belle either accepts 
or rejects them based on her evaluation of whether they fit, it seems to me that neither one of 
them is creative (nor is the system comprised of both). One doesn’t know what she’s doing, 
and the other is no more creative than a listener who recognizes a good riff without ever 
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having come up with one. Some Darwinian theories of creativity do talk about “blind 
variation and selective retention” (Simonton 2009, 65), but even on such views variation isn’t 
random, but rather depends on association of relevant ideas.  
Production, selection, and realization of novel ideas is an intentional activity, or at 
least occurs in the course of an intentional activity. When they’re at work, artists try to come 
up with something new and valuable. Yet there’s an old puzzle about the teleological 
character of creativity, as exceptionalists emphasize: unlike in the case of non-creative 
activity, say trying to construct an Ikea shelf, the artist does not and cannot know in advance 
precisely what it is that she is aiming at, or should would have already had to finish the real 
creative work (e.g. Tomas 1958). When Marvell was composing his poem, he was trying to 
find the right word, but at the outset of the process, he didn’t know that the right word would 
be “vegetable” – he could only come to know what constituted the realization of his aim when 
he actually realized it by coming up with the right word (or a right word). How did he then 
know that it was the right word when he came up with it? Tomasi’s suggestion is that 
although the artist “cannot say precisely where he is going while he is still on the way”, ”he 
can say that certain directions are not right” – he can exercise critical judgment that tells him 
whether a word or line is correct, and so remain in control of the process (1958, 13). 
According to Berys Gaut, however, this ‘propulsive’ model of the creative process can’t be 
correct, because it “leaves it utterly mysterious how the artist knows that he is on the wrong 
track. For unless he has some conception of his goal in mind, how can he know that he is 
going astray?” (Gaut 2009, 89) So Gaut believes that the artist must have a goal already in 
mind to make the necessary judgment, and that artistic ’flair’ consists in a skill of realizing 
such aims. 
 I think this apparent conflict between non-teleological and teleological views of the 
creative process can be resolved in the good old-fashioned way, by making a distinction 
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between two kinds of aim, which I’ll call a guiding aim and an aspirational aim. A guiding 
aim is the kind of aim we have when we try to make one chair the same color as another, for 
example. At each step of the process, we can compare, if only mentally, the stage we’re at 
with the end-state, and adjust our work accordingly. We know what constitutes realizing the 
aim: the chair we’re painting is the same colour as the model. An ordinary skill is a matter of 
having dispositions that allow us to realize a guiding aim reliably, efficiently, economically, 
and so on.  
An aspirational aim, in contrast, is something that motivates us but cannot itself 
provide guidance. Why? I’ll stipulate that an aspirational aim’s content includes an evaluative 
predicate – for example, you aim to design a beautiful house, or effectively portray the horror 
of war. The function of such predicates is not just to describe things. It’s always an open 
question whether they apply to an object that has some particular attitude-independent 
features – they are, as it’s often put, essentially contestable. For example, if you’re only told 
that Guernica effectively portrays the horrors of war in a visual medium, you simply don’t 
know what it looks like. Plausibly, Picasso’s aim when he started painting it was to create 
something along those lines. To begin with, he didn’t know either what a painting that 
effectively portrays the horrors of war looked like, so the aim couldn’t directly guide his 
drawing and painting, in the way that the aim of connecting the dots in a paint-by-numbers 
picture could have. But the aspiration was there, motivating the search and somehow helped 
settle what the right creative choices were. But how? Recall Anna and Belle. Tomasi’s 
proposal sounds uncomfortably like the picture on which Anna somehow comes up with 
random suggestions, and Belle then exercises critical judgment to select some. Nor is Gaus’s 
criticism without force: while it’s readily intelligible how a guiding aim allows judgment of 
right direction, it’s not clear how an aspirational aim could do so. So here we have yet another 
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puzzle: how does a merely aspirational aim play a role in a creative process without serving as 
a blueprint for it?  
Here’s what I think: a key element in creativity is broadly speaking perceptual, and 
aspirational aims play their role by influencing perception, perhaps by way of directing 
attention, in addition to their more mundane role in motivating bringing about suitable 
circumstances for creative achievement (such as acquiring the necessary materials, tools, 
space etc.). This idea should be plausible on the face of it. After all, we often reach for visual 
or tactile metaphors when we try to describe the process of creating something – we say 
someone saw or grasped something or had a vision or was struck by something. My 
conjecture is that creativity involves the perception or conception of certain sort of 
possibilities in a raw material. 
I’ll grant straight away that when I talk about ‘perception’ here, I’m using the term in 
a very broad sense. However, it has become increasingly popular in the philosophy of 
perception to hold that we can perceive non-actual possibilities. For example, as I look around 
while writing this, I can see that I can touch the wall if I reach that way, or that the table could 
have been painted differently (cf. Strohminger 2015). Using a term introduced by the 
psychologist J.J. Gibson (1979), Susanna Siegel (2014, 54–55) argues that we experience 
affordances, that is, possibilities for action, and that some of these positively solicit specific 
action – for example, I may experience raspberry and white chocolate ice cream in a tub as 
inviting me to take a spoonful. To be sure, if I didn’t like ice cream, my experience would be 
different. But, Siegel observes, the perception of affordance isn’t just a matter of adding 
feeling to neutral perception: for example, without feeling any inclination to dance, you might 
hear a song as calling for you to dance, or as being designed to move people to dance (ibid., 
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55).4 Note also that such perceptions of affordance or solicitation are distinct from 
imaginings: when you see that you could use a hook to catch a rope, you don’t imagine that 
the hook can catch a rope. To be sure, imagining that things are otherwise than they are can be 
part of the process by which we come to conceive of a creative solution, but I think we’re apt 
to exaggerate the importance of imagination to creativity. 
So, I think that a key element of artistic creativity is perceiving or conceiving certain 
novel affordances or solicitations for molding or making or shaping some raw material (or 
using a medium) in a way that gives it a new significance that fits with the aspirational aim. 
It’s not true to the phenomenology of creativity, I believe, that there are two separate stages 
of production and selection of ideas, and as the Anna and Belle case suggests, it is hard to 
find a space for creativity in such a model. Rather, the artist simultaneously perceives or 
conceives of a possibility and regards it as a worthwhile contender for promoting the 
aspirational aim, or simply recognizes it as (perhaps partially) realizing it. Often, when one 
shapes the material to realize this possibility, the resulting new configuration stimulates 
another perception of a further way of contributing to the aspirational aim.5 
For example, either as a result of study or some freak talent, a great traditional 
painter sees that painting a figure in a particular section of the work in such-and-such pose 
would convey defiance or tenderness, or that such-and-such stroke of paint would make a 
smile more mysterious. (This entails, of course, that the modification of the material would 
indeed constitute a good way to convey defiance, for example.) Or someone like Georgia 
O’Keeffe conceives of specific shapes and rhythms of colour as a way of evoking something 
as abstract as music. In the same vein, it is natural to say that a poet puts her finger on 
 
4 While Siegel (2014) postulates ‘answerability contents’ to explain the nature and accuracy 
conditions of solicitations and experienced mandates, I myself prefer an imperativist account 
of the content of such experiences (Kauppinen 2021). 
5 Perhaps this is part of what Collingwood means when he says that for a painter, painting and 
seeing are each conditional upon the other (1938, 304) – the visual “experience itself only 
develops and defines itself in your mind as you paint” (ibid., 303). 
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something the rest of us can’t quite articulate, exploiting possibilities in the raw material of 
language that are in principle available to us all. A novelist or dramatist notices something 
about human interaction or psychological development, and by constructing a story or drama 
around it, draws her audience’s attention to it by carving out the things that ordinarily obstruct 
it from view. A composer hears a groovy bassline in her mind when hearing a topline melody, 
and can sing it or write it out in the form of staff notation.  
What I say here is sometimes echoed by the testimony of artists themselves. Look at 
this unfinished sculpture by Michelangelo 
 
 
and consider the apocryphal quote attributed to him: “In every block of marble I see a statue 
as plain as though it stood before me, shaped and perfect in attitude and action. I have only to 
hew away the rough walls that imprison the lovely apparition to reveal it to the other eyes as 
mine see it.”6 For a similar idea expressed in the context of a very different form of art, some 
 
6 I’ve found no evidence he actually said this, but he did write, more prosaically, that “The 
sculptor arrives at his end by taking away what is superfluous.” (Letter to Benedetto Varchi, 
https://it.wikisource.org/wiki/Lettera_a_messer_Benedetto_Varchi) 
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time ago, I happened to see a clip of the Edge being interviewed on YouTube, in which he 
said the following: “Whenever I pick up a guitar, I’m like ‘OK, I know there’s songs in here. I 
just need to… find them’.”7 Or, finally, switching to modern sculpture, here’s how Robert 
Hughes describes Robert Rauschenberg’s method for putting together his 1950s avant-garde 
assemblages, with a direct quote: 
An afternoon’s stroll in downtown Manhattan could and did furnish him with a 
complete “palette” of things to make art with: cardboard cartons, broken striped 
barrier-poles, sea-tar, a mangy stuffed bird, a broken umbrella, discarded tyres, a 
shaving mirror, old postcards. “I actually had a kind of house rule. If I walked 
completely around the block and didn’t find enough to work with, I could take one 
other block and walk around it in any direction – but that was it. The works had to 




7 https://youtu.be/D4e16arIxbs?t=39s. It’s been a while since’s he’s found what he’s looking 
for. 
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Here, again, neither effort nor a guiding aim seems to be in the picture – Rauschenberg walks 
around, notices disparate things, and conceives of a way to put them together, all in service of 
his aspirational aim of capturing what’s interesting about his world. 
To some extent, we’re all capable of seeing novel possibilities for giving some 
material a shape that resonates – we’re all more or less creative. But some people have a 
disposition or tendency, or a talent that is distinct from technical ability, to perceive them, 
often as a result of years of study and perhaps certain personality traits. To confirm that this is 
really worth calling a case of perception, we could employ Siegel’s (2009) method of 
phenomenal contrast. In her most famous example, someone who is hired to cut down pine 
trees without initially knowing what they look like comes to have a different visual 
experience of the trees when he gains the relevant recognitional disposition – the forest now 
looks different to him (Siegel 2009, 100). I contend that a block of marble looks different to 
me than it did to Michelangelo – not in terms of size or hardness, but in terms of the 
possibilities for shaping it contains. There’s a phenomenal contrast, which reflects a 
difference in the content of the experience. In other cases, to be sure, this is more obscure – 
it’s more natural to say that a poet conceives of new possibilities for using the medium of 
language rather than hearing words differently from the rest of us. Even so, the poet might 
experience the sound of one word as suggesting another when I don’t. 
What is more, the possibilities artists see or conceive of in a raw material or medium 
are such that coming to share the vision them helps the audience to come to learn or 
appreciate something important, or directly pleases, uplifts, or moves them – that is, they have 
genuine aesthetic value, or serve the aspirational aim. They also have the will and skill to 
realize their vision in a form that makes it possible to communicate it to others, at least to 
some extent. Here’s how I’d tentatively formulate this in the form of a thesis: 
Creative Perception 
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Aesthetic creativity fundamentally consists of perceiving or conceiving, in a raw 
material or medium, novel affordances or solicitations that serve an aesthetic 
aspirational aim, and shaping it so that some such possibilities are realized.8 
 
As far as I can see, this view is consistent with many theories of how one comes to perceive 
or conceive such novel possibilities – it might be by way of divine inspiration, unconscious 
association, blind variation and selective retention, or analogical reasoning. But it contrasts 
with views that emphasize evaluative judgment, random variation, or means-end rationality. I 
think it could easily be extended to cover, say, creativity in engineering or philosophy by 
varying the content of the aspirational aim and the object of perception or conception. In the 
next section, I’ll explain how thinking of creativity in this way helps solve the puzzles I 
started with.  
 
4. Resolving the Puzzles of Merit and Achievement 
Suppose, then, that Picasso’s or Marvell’s creativity consisted in perceiving or conceiving of 
affordances that served their aspirational aims and working them out. What are the 
implications of this for the question regarding the grounds of artistic merit? Is creative 
perception attributable to the artist? I think so. Recall that the criterion for attributability is not 
control but self-disclosure. To be sure, the self that is disclosed by creative perception is very 
different from a deep self in the usual sense. It is not the self as a valuer or carer, but the self 
as an active perceiver. Part of who you are is that things strike you in this way or that way in 
pursuit of an aspirational aim. To ward off possible misunderstanding, I’m not denying that 
our values and cares affect what and how we perceive things. They certainly do (see Suni 
 
8 Some people hold that strictly speaking, the product of the creative process is the idea, and 
the realizing it is just a matter of ordinary skill. Instead of entering this debate, I’ll just hereby 
give permission to those who hold the view to scratch out the last clause (unless this is a 
library book). 
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2022 for a detailed examination). But it seems plain that two people with the same attitudinal 
profile and sensory inputs might still perceive differently, especially when it comes to 
solicitations. For that to be possible, and not just by way of chance, it seems we must be 
capable of spontaneity that goes beyond desire, intention, or evaluation, or conscious choice 
for reasons. And that is the locus of our creativity with its interesting profile: it is neither 
passive or lucky nor under our voluntary or rational control. 
Some might take issue with the claim that absence of voluntary control is compatible 
with merit. For example, in the course of defending the importance of skill for creativity, Gaut 
argues that “In describing someone as creative, we accord her a kind of credit for her 
activities, and we do not give credit for mere luck.” (Gaut 2012, 267). Skill, of course, does 
bring an activity under some degree of volitional control. For most creative achievements, 
some sort of skill is certainly necessary for realizing the perceived possibility for serving the 
aspirational aim, but that is secondary to the perception or conception itself. And although 
there are perceptual skills (such as the ability to tell the make and model of a car from seeing 
a small part of it), they’re not the sort of thing it is natural to attribute to someone like 
Picasso. So I don’t think perceiving novel affordances is under voluntary control via skill. 
Nevertheless, it still doesn’t seem that it’s just luck that got Michelangelo to see the statue in 
a block of marble – even though he couldn’t bring about seeing it with an act of will.  
It thus fortunate that it has become commonplace to deny that the absence of 
voluntary control entails that something happens by sheer luck – after all, I don’t have 
voluntary control over whether I believe it’s now sunny, but that I (correctly) believe so is not 
a matter of luck either.9 As I said above, it is common these days to think that our beliefs are 
under a kind of control in virtue of issuing from reasons-responsive capacities or competences 
 
9 To be sure, you might say there’s a kind of constitutive luck involved in my having the 
abilities and competences necessary for knowing that it’s sunny, but that doesn’t undermine 
in any way the fact that my knowledge is creditable to me. 
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of our own. But is active perception or conception under rational control either? On 
prominent conceptions of what is involved in rational control, such as McHugh (2013), it’s 
arguably not – even if there are reasons to move the brush or bend a string in a particular way, 
the artist need not be able to recognize them as reasons, or be capable of reasoning to the 
conclusion that it’s the right thing to do.10 
My view, then, is that active perception or conception manifests what I will call 
spontaneous agency. Suppose, again, that Marvell realizes that talking about “vegetable love” 
reinforces the depiction of the impatient lover’s perspective in a striking way. Plausibly, there 
is a kind of analogical transfer in play – vegetables, after all, are notably slow-moving things. 
In more general terms, this is a matter of complex pattern-recognition and pattern-extension 
into new domains or contexts: recognizing the parallels between vegetable growth and 
imperceptibly progressing emotions, as well as recognizing that drawing such parallels is new 
and unusual, and that the word “vegetable” fits in the rhyming scheme of the poem, and more. 
(The patterns regarding shapes and colours in painting are quite different – if you think of 
how Picasso drew Don Quijote’s head, presumably in the background are the people and 
paintings of people he’s seen, the descriptions by Cervantes, and so on – but I think the 
principle is the same.) Naturally, there is an endless variety of such patterns to be recognized 
and extended into new domains or contexts. The ones that Marvell picks out depend on at 
least two things: his personal history and experiences, on the one hand, and the emotional 
resonance of those patterns for him. The particular one he chose presumably felt right to him 
in the light of his aspirational aim, and he trusted his feeling enough to go ahead with it. I 
don’t think that this suffices for us to say that he was in control of what came to his mind. But 
I think this interplay of pattern recognition/extension, emotional resonance, and self-directed 
attitudes does suffice for us to recognize coming up with the phrase as his activity, something 
 
10 Nor is creative perception habitual, like the non-deliberate control we exercise when driving 
a familiar route. (Thanks to David Shoemaker for emphasizing this.)  
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in which Marvell himself is at work, even if he doesn’t control what he does. It’s not just luck 
(Marvell would have come up with an apt word in many nearby possible worlds), and may 
even amount to a kind of competence that is incompatible with sheer luck (recall here 
Bradford’s emphasis on competent causation). 
Perhaps it is granted that such spontaneous agency exists and in part defines who we 
are. But what kind of credit or discredit do we deserve for the way we exercise our 
spontaneity? Clearly, we shouldn’t be held accountable for it. You shouldn’t resent me for 
lacking Michelangelo’s (or, say, Philippa Foot’s) vision. But the kind of responsibility 
responses that Shoemaker talks about do seem potentially fitting, in particular admiration and 
even elevation. Drawing on empirical literature, Shoemaker suggests that admiration involves 
“feelings of uplift, thoughts about agential excellence, and action tendencies for emulation 
and/or self-improvement” (2015, 40). These are the right sort of responses to people who 
excellently exercise their ability for creative perception/conception in the service of 
aspirational aims, though emulation may be out of our reach.11 Their successful creative 
agency reveals something important about them, and not only to others. On my proposal, it is 
predictable that creating art is also a process of self-discovery, even when it doesn’t explicitly 
aim at it. 
 
Artistic Achievement 
Finally, let me turn to what I’ve just said means for achievement and difficulty. I’ve accepted 
that all achievements are difficult, but denied that difficulty entails intense effort. Instead, the 
fundamental reason why successful artistic performances are difficult is that it’s hard to 
 
11 Does it matter here why the artist adopts the aspirational aim? Matthew Kieran (2014) 
argues that it does – in my language, that someone who is intrinsically motivated by, say, 
search for beauty is more likely to perceive what serves a valuable aspirational aim than 
someone who adopts the same aim because of external rewards. And whether or not that is the 
case, they merit more admiration. 
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perceive or conceive of significant new possibilities for realizing aspirational aims in raw 
materials – even if we have training and talent and habituation and understanding. One reason 
it’s so hard is that effort doesn’t suffice, and indeed may get in the way. To be sure, it seems 
that what often happens is that you deliberately try to create circumstances in which the 
inspiration or insight arrives. This may, of course, require some effort. But walking around 
the block with eyes peeled, like Rauschenberg did, hardly requires intense effort. Looking at 
the bigger picture, it is also true that coming to see things in a way that is not only 
psychologically novel but also something historically new and valuable characteristically 
takes a lot of study and practice. As Simon Blackburn puts it, in most cases, “there is a long 
apprenticeship, a painstaking mastery of craft skills learned from, and often imitative of, those 
who have so far led the field, and preceding any great leap forward. The pianist’s answer to a 
fan who gushed how lucky he was—“yes, and the more I practise the luckier I get”—pretty 
much sums it up.” (Blackburn 2014, 152) I don't want to deny any of this. Nevertheless, 
whether such practice and other preparatory activities require effort, even intense effort, or 
dogged persistence, they are not what we get aesthetic credit for. It wouldn’t diminish the 
creative achievement if you immediately saw what you need to do. Indeed, there are many 
examples of ideas coming in a dream, which is allegedly how Keith Richards found the riff of 
‘Satisfaction’ and Paul McCartney came up with the melody of ‘Yesterday’. There are also 
prodigies who don’t seem to require much practice. And if you didn’t come up with creative 
products, that ‘great leap forward’, you wouldn’t deserve aesthetic credit for your ten 
thousand hours of practice, or whatever. 
 Still, in spite of the unimportance of effort, artistic achievements are difficult even 
for artists, as anyone can verify by checking out Paul McCartney’s post-Beatles oeuvre. Is 
there something in common to the difficulty of creating a revealing portrait and the difficulty 
of running a marathon, then? I think there is, and I’ll finish with a suggestion. Let’s start with 
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the notion of trying, which is intuitively connected with difficulty. (To avoid 
misunderstanding, let me emphasize that trying to do something is compatible with 
succeeding, although in ordinary conversation we often talk about trying only when someone 
failed or may fail at their task.) I’ll stipulate that to try to X, you must aim at X-ing, make 
some effort to X, have some idea of how to X, and make use of this idea in your attempt to X. 
If I try to draw a triangle, I must aim to draw a triangle, or that’s not what I’m trying to do. If 
I don’t make any effort to draw a triangle, I’m not trying to draw a triangle, even if I really 
want to do so. If I have no idea of how to draw a triangle, I can’t even begin to do so, so I 
can’t try to do it. (A small child who doesn’t at all know how to draw a triangle can’t try to do 
so, even if they know what a triangle is.) If I don’t make sufficient use of my knowledge of 
how to draw a triangle, I’m not trying to do so, even if I happen to produce one.  
 With this notion of trying in mind, we can tentatively define agent-relative difficulty 
as follows: 
 The Simple Trying Account of Agent-Relative Difficulty 
Activity X is difficult for S in C if and only if it’s possible for S to perform X in C 
but S’s simply trying to X doesn’t suffice to make it likely that S performs X 
successfully in C. 
 
Roughly, something is difficult for me if it’s unlikely I’ll succeed by simply trying.12 (I might 
still succeed, but that would be due to sheer luck.) Before discussing this further, I want to 
explicitly endorse Bradford’s (2015) method for generalizing from agent-relative difficult to 
difficulty, period – roughly, we should look at average agent-relative difficulty for the 
contextually relevant set of individuals.  
 
12 Von Kriegstein (2019) also emphasizes low probability of success in his account, but tries 
(in my view unsuccessfully) use an average adult’s capacities as a reference point. 
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So, let’s test and clarify this thesis with some examples. Saying ‘abracadabra’ is not 
difficult for me, because simply trying to say it makes it likely that I succeed. Note that even 
though it’s not difficult for me, I might still fail, even holding fixed my circumstances, such 
as my state of inebriation. Similarly, walking to the shop is not difficult for me in my present 
physical condition, as it’s likely I’ll succeed by simply trying. However, note that the amount 
of effort it takes to simply try to walk to the shop is larger than the amount it takes to simply 
try to say ‘abracadabra’ – I haven’t really tried to walk to the shop if I don’t start putting one 
foot in front of another for some time. 
 Running a marathon, in turn, is difficult for me in my present (or past or future) 
physical condition. At the very least, I’d have to try very hard, rather than simply try it. In this 
type of case, the explanation for why simply trying to X won’t make success likely is that it 
takes a lot of intense effort. In contrast, running a marathon per se is not difficult for Kenenisa 
Bekele, who would indeed simply need to try to run the requisite amount of miles. Running a 
marathon in 2.05, in contrast, would be difficult even for Bekele – that takes intense effort 
even for the fittest runners.  
 It’s also difficult, if not impossible, for me to create an aesthetically valuable 
painting. Again, simply trying to do so won’t make my success likely. But neither would 
trying very hard. My problem can’t be remedied with effort, since it comes down to 
something like lack of talent, or lack of immersion in the practice and tradition. But, as I’ve 
said, the same goes for Picasso, mutatis mutandis. In his case, too, simply trying won’t suffice 
– nor will trying hard. The explanation for why simply trying doesn’t make success likely is 
different in this case. It’s that success takes more than effort or skill or talent – it takes 
inspiration, vision, or insight, or generally speaking fruitful spontaneous activity that is 
beyond voluntary and rational control. And such things cannot be called forth by direct effort, 
though we can of course strive to create the right circumstances for exercising our 
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spontaneity. So the reason why simply trying won’t suffice is not that one has to try hard to 
succeed, but that the relevant capacity isn’t under direct control in the first place. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As I was finishing this chapter, I came across a comment by the art historian Herbert 
Molderings, who holds that at the core of Duchamp’s aesthetics was “the idea that all things 
can be perceived and conceived differently” (2010, xv). I’ve tried to make the case that this 
simple idea captures a lot about what’s distinctive of creative processes, which at some point 
escape our voluntary and rational control but can nevertheless ground aesthetic merit. 
Evidently, a lot of reflection and reasoning may precede adopting what I’ve called an 
aspirational aim, and a lot of practice may facilitate coming to perceive or conceive of 
possibilities that contribute to realizing it, when the material or medium is shaped according 
to such perceptions or conceptions. But my thesis has been that in the end, novelty enters the 
process via something like spontaneous extension of a pattern that resonates with the artist 
and manifests itself in active perception. Since such creative perceptions are attributable to us, 
we deserve credit for the resulting realization of aspirational aims, if they have aesthetic or 
other value. Since we can’t bring them about by simply trying, creating worthwhile art is 
difficult even if it is effortless when successful, and may thus amount to a significant 
achievement. So if the way you experience the world turns out to be beautiful, as Rooney’s 
protagonist put it, it is fine and proper to admire or even love you.13 
 
13 This paper has its origins on my comments to Susan Wolf’s Donnellan Lectures on 
aesthetic responsibility at Trinity College Dublin in May 2017. I’m grateful to her for 
inspiration and feedback. I also owe special thanks to Gwen Bradford who invited me to 
present the original version of this paper at a session on Achievement and Difficulty at the 
Central APA in Chicago in February 2018, and has discussed the ideas with me on several 
occasions. I’m also grateful to Lilian O’Brien and David Shoemaker for generous written 
comments, and audiences in Chicago, Helsinki, and Houston for insightful criticisms, 
especially Dane Gogoshin, Säde Hormio, Uriah Kriegel, Hasko von Kriegstein, Jason 
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